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D Omitted Proofs
D.1 Proofs for Appendix A
D.1.1 Proof of Lemma A.1












|f(x′)|dx′ = ‖f‖ <∞.
Thus, TC : L1 → L1. Moreover, since TC is clearly linear, the above ensures that it is also
continuous.
For the second point, consider f ∈ I. Since C is assortative, TCf(x) ≥ TCf(x′) for all
x ≥ x′, so that TCf is weakly increasing. To show that TCf is absolutely continuous, note that


















c2(y, z)f(y)dydz + TCf(x
′),
where c2 denotes the partial derivative of c with respect to the second argument, which ex-
ists almost everywhere by the absolute continuity assumption on c. Thus TCf is absolutely
continuous with (TCf)′(z) =
´ 1
0
c2(y, z)f(y)dy for each z.



















which vanishes as τ ′ →∞. Thus, the sequence is Cauchy. Since the space L1 is complete, this
yields the desired result.
D.1.2 Proof of Lemma A.3
%m-order: It is clear from the definition that %m is reflexive and transitive; moreover, by
Lemma A.2, %m is linear. To check that %m is continuous, take sequences fn → f, gn → g in
1









































f %m g by Lemma A.2.







TCh(x)dx = 0. It suffices to show that
´ 1
y
TCh(x)dx ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1).
To see this, note that
´ 1
y











































c(x|z)dx = 1 − C(y|z), the third holds by
integration by parts (using absolute continuity of c), the fourth uses
´ 1
0




h(z′)dz′ ≤ 0 (by f %m g) and assortativity of C.
%d-order: It is clear from the definition that %d is reflexive, transitive, and linear. To check
that it is continuous, take sequences fn → f and gn → g in I such that fn %d gn for each n. By
standard results (e.g., Theorem 13.6 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)), we can find subsequences
(fnk)k∈N, (gnk)k∈N such that fnk(x) → f(x) and gnk(x) → g(x) for almost all x ∈ (0, 1). This
implies f(x) − f(x′) ≥ g(x) − g(x′) for almost all x ≥ x′, which ensures f %d g since f and g
are continuous.
To show that %d is isotone, first consider any bounded f, g ∈ I such that f %d g. Since f
and g are absolutely continuous, there exist integrable functions f ′, g′ : (0, 1) → R such that
f(x) = f(0) +
´ x
0
f ′(y) dy and g(x) = g(0) +
´ x
0
g′(y) dy for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any x ≥ x′























g(y)(c(y|x)− c(y|x′))dy = TCg(x)− TCg(x′).
2
Here, the inequality holds because the fact that f %d g and f, g ∈ I implies f ′(y) ≥ g′(y) ≥ 0
for almost all y ∈ (0, 1).





) if x ∈ (0, 1
n
)














) if x ∈ (0, 1
n
)











for each n ∈ N, we obtain fn %d gn for each n and fn → f, gn → g. For any C ∈ C, since
TC is a continuous operator, this implies TCfn → TCf and TCgn → TCg. Thus, TCf %d TCg
by continuity of %d, as we already know that TCfn %d TCgn from the previous part of the
proof.
D.1.3 Proof of Lemma A.4
The base case t = 0 holds because of the following result by Ryff (1963): Call a linear operator
T : L1 → L1 an S-operator if f %m Tf for all F ∈ I. The representation theorem in Ryff
(1963) implies that T is an S-operator if there exists some measurable function K : [0, 1]2 → R




K(x, y)f(y)dy for all f ∈ L1 and almost every x and the following
conditions are met: (1) K(0, y) = 0 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ 1; (2) essupyV (K(·, y)) < ∞, where V (·)
denotes the total variation and essup the essential supremum; (3)
´ 1
0
K(x, y)f(y)dy is absolutely
continuous in x for all f ∈ L1; (4) x =
´ 1
0
K(x, y)dy; (5) x1 < x2 =⇒ K(x1, ·) ≤ K(x2, ·); and
(6) K(1, y) = 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Since C ∈ C, it is easy to see that TC satisfies these conditions with K(x, y) := C(x | y) for
all x, y, so that TC is an S-operator. Thus, f %m TCf , proving the base case. The inductive
step then follows from isotonicity of %m (Lemma A.3).
D.2 Proofs for Appendix C
D.2.1 Proof of Proposition C.1
Let µ := EF [θ]. Consider strategy profiles gαa and gαc of assortativity neglect and correct agents
expressed as functions of quantiles. Write gα := αgαa + (1− α)gαc . In an α-ANE, we must have
gαa (x) = F
−1(x) + (β + γ)TCg






for each x ∈ (0, 1). Since gα = αgαa + (1− α)gαc , it follows that
gα(x) = F−1(x) + (γ + αβ)TCg









1−β−γ by integrating both sides over x. Moreover,







(1− γ − αβ)(1− β − γ)
,
where the convergence of the RHS can be shown as in the proof of Lemma 1. Note that this
uniquely determines gα for any α. By the best-response conditions, we obtain
gαa (x) = F
−1(x) + (β + γ)TCg
α(x)





(β + γ)(1− α)βµ
(1− γ − αβ)(1− β − γ)
,











(1− α(β + γ)) βµ
(1− γ − αβ)(1− β − γ)
for each x, yielding (18)-(19). Then the claim gαa %d gαc and the comparative statics with respect
to α can be verified using linearity and continuity of %d.
D.2.2 Proof of Proposition C.2
Write P = (F,C). Consider any PANE s with
´
a dĜθ(a) absolutely continuous in θ. Then
s(θ) = θ+β
´
a dĜθ(a)+γEP [s(θ′)|θ] for each θ. Thus, s is the Nash equilibrium in environment
(F̃ , C, β̃, γ), where β̃ = 0 and F̃−1(x) = F−1(x) + β
´
a dĜF−1(x)(a) for each x (note that
F̃ ∈ F , as
´
adĜθ(a) is increasing and absolutely continuous in θ). Since F̃ is more dispersive
than F (and the global complementarity parameter does not affect Nash action dispersion by
Proposition 4), Proposition 3 implies that Gs,P is more dispersive than the Nash global action
distribution in environment (P, β, γ).
D.2.3 Details for Example C.1
Fix any ρ̂ ∈ [0, ρ]. We verify that, for the expressions in Example C.1, s∗ is a PANE and
(P̂θ, ŝθ) are associated coherent perceptions. Let x := 11−γρ−β ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
and x̂ := 1
1−γρ̂ , so that s
∗(θ) =
x(θ − µ) + µ
1−β−γ and ŝθ(θ
′) = x̂(θ′ − µ̂θ) + µ̂θ1−β−γ for all θ, θ
′. Since P (·|θ) is distributed
N (ρθ + (1 − ρ)µ, (1 − ρ2)σ2), θ’s true local action distribution Ls
∗,P
θ is distributed N (xρ(θ −
µ)+ µ
1−β−γ , x
2(1−ρ2)σ2). Since P̂θ(·|θ) is distributed N (ρ̂θ+(1− ρ̂)µ̂θ, (1− ρ̂2)σ̂2), θ’s perceived










To verify condition 2, note that, by construction, θ’s perceived strategy profile ŝθ is the
Nash equilibrium in society P̂θ = (µ̂θ, σ̂2, ρ̂) (see Example 1).
Finally, we verify that s∗ is a PANE with perceived global action distributions Ĝθ = Ĝŝθ,P̂θ ,
as required by condition 1(b). Note first that, by construction, s∗(θ) = ŝθ(θ) for all θ. Thus,
4
conditions 1(a) and 2 imply that s∗(θ) ∈ BRθ(Ĝŝθ,P̂θ , Ls
∗,P
θ ). It remains to check that Ĝ
ŝθ,P̂θ
is FOSD-increasing in θ. This holds because Ĝŝθ,P̂θ is distributed N ( µ̂θ
1−β−γ , x̂
2σ̂2) and because
ρ̂ ≤ ρ ensures that µ̂θ is increasing in θ.
D.2.4 Proof of Proposition C.3
We only consider Nash equilibrium, as ANE at (P, β, γ) corresponds to Nash equilibrium at







(1− γ)(1− β − γ)
,
which is a well-defined function in L1 as |γ| < 1. Following the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 1, the strategy profile defined by sNE(θ) = h(F−1(θ)) for each θ is the unique Nash
equilibrium and satisfies (5).








(1− γ)(1− β − γ)
.
Since γ > −1, the additional assumption on P implies that F−1 +γTCF−1 is strictly increasing.
Therefore, h, and hence sNE, is strictly increasing.
D.2.5 Proof of Proposition C.4
We first show that, analogously to the relationship between %MA and %m (Lemma B.1), the
strongly more-assortative order %SMA is the “dual order” of the dispersiveness order %d:
Lemma D.1. Fix any C1, C2 ∈ C. Then C1 %SMA C2 if and only if TC1f %d TC2f for all
f ∈ I.
Proof. For the “only if” part, suppose that C1 %SMA C2. First consider any bounded f ∈ I.
Then there exists an integrable function f ′ : (0, 1)→ R that is nonnegative almost everywhere
such that f(x) = f(0) +
´ x
0
























f(y)(c2(y|x)− c2(y|x′))dy = TC2f(x)− TC2f(x′),
5
where the inequality holds because f ′(y) ≥ 0 for almost all y. Hence, TC1f %d TC2f .
Next take an arbitrary f ∈ I. Define the sequence of bounded functions (fn) as in (20),
so that fn → f . By the previous observation, we have TC1fn %d TC2fn for each n. Since
TC1fn → TC1f and TC2fn → TC2f by continuity of TC1 and TC2 , continuity of %d then yields
TC1f %d TC2f .
For the “if” part, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose that C1 is not strongly more assor-
tative than C2. That is, there exist y and x > x′ such that
C2(y|x)− C2(y|x′) < C1(y|x)− C1(y|x′) ≤ 0.
Since C1 and C2 admit densities, the above inequality holds throughout some interval (y1, y2) 3
y. Define f ∈ I by f(z) =
´ z
0
f ′(y′)dy′ for all z, where f ′ is an integrable function given by
f ′(y′) = 1 for y′ ∈ (y1, y2) and f ′(y′) = 0 for all y′ 6∈ (y1, y2). Using the same integration by
parts argument as above, we obtain





f ′(y)(C2(y|x)− C2(y|x′))dy = TC2f(x)− TC2f(x′).
Thus, TC1f %d TC2f fails.
Proof of Proposition C.4. Note that Nash and ANE strategies are monotone by the as-
sumption on Pi (Proposition C.3). We prove each part only for Nash, as the ANE at (P, β, γ)
is the Nash at (P, 0, β + γ). For each f, g ∈ I, write f %dil g iff f %m g + α for some constant
function α. This order inherits linearity, isotonicity, and continuity from %m. Note that for
F,G ∈ F , F is a dilation of G iff F−1 %dil G−1; moreover, the %dil order is implied by the %d
order.
Second part: Let β := β1 = β2, γ := γ1 = γ2, C := C1 = C2. The proof of Proposition 3
carries over to the case γ ≥ 0, so we focus on the case γ < 0. Since β only shifts the action
mean without affecting the dilation order, we also assume β = 0 without loss.
For each i = 1, 2, define an operator Γi : I → I by Γif = F−1i + γTCF−1i + γ2T 2Cf for each
f ∈ I. Note that Γi(·) is increasing, as (1 + γTC)F−1i is increasing by the assumption on Pi.
We make two preliminary observations:
1. For i = 1, 2, Γif %dil Γig whenever f %dil g.
This follows from isotonicity of %dil.
2. Γ1f %dil Γ2f for each f ∈ I.




1 − F−12 ∈ I. Thus,
F−11 − F−12 %m TC(F−11 − F−12 ) %dil −γTC(F−11 − F−12 ),







2 , and thus Γ1f %dil Γ2f for each f ∈ I.








This is the inverse cdf of GNEi , as sNEi is increasing. By induction, we show that Γt1f %dil Γt2f for






1 f %dil Γ
t
2f
holds by observations 1-2. Given this, g1 %dil g2 follows by continuity of %dil.
First part: Let F := F1 = F2, β := β1 = β2, γ := γ1 = γ2. The proof of Proposition 2 carries
over to the case γ ≤ 0, so we focus on the case γ < 0. Since β only shifts the action mean without





is the inverse cdf of GNEi since sNEi is monotone.













)(1− γiTCi)f = f, (21)














by the second equality in (21) with i = 2 and f = g1. This shows that g1 and g2 correspond to the
inverse cdfs of the Nash action distributions in two modified environments that share a common
interaction structure C2 and complementarity parameters (0, γ) and have type distributions F̃1
and F̃2 with inverse cdfs F̃−11 := (1 − γTC2)g1 and F̃−12 := (1 − γTC1)g1, respectively. Since
g1 ∈ I, γ < 0, and C1 %SMA C2, Lemma D.1 implies F̃−12 %d F̃−11 .
Given this, the arguments in part 2 above imply that g2 %dil g1, provided we can show
that (1 + γTC2)F̃
−1
i is increasing for i = 1, 2 (which ensures that the corresponding operators
Γi(·) in the two modified societies are increasing). For i = 2, note that (1 + γTC2)F̃−12 :=
(1 + γTC2)(1 − γTC1)g1 = (1 + γTC2)F−1 by (21), which is increasing by the assumption on
P2 and since γ > −1. For i = 1, note that (i) (1 − γ2T 2C1)g1 = (1 + γTC1)F
−1 is increasing
(by the assumption on P1 and since γ > −1), and (ii) γ2T 2C1g1 %d γ
2T 2C2g1 since C1 %SMA C2
(Lemma D.1). Combining (i) and (ii) yields that (1+ γTC2)F̃
−1
1 := (1− γ2T 2C2)g1 is increasing,
as required.
Third part: Let F := F1 = F2, C := C1 = C2. The proof of Proposition 4 carries over to the
case γi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. Thus, by the transitivity of the dilation order, we can focus on the case
γi ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2. Since β only shifts the action mean without affecting the dilation order, we







−1; this is the inverse cdf of GNEi





















by the second equality in (21) with i = 1 and f = g2. This shows that g1 and g2 can be seen
as inverse cdfs of Nash action distributions in two modified environments that share a common
interaction structure C and complementarity parameters (0, γ1) and have type distributions F̃1
and F̃2 with inverse cdfs F̃−11 := (1 − γ2TC)g2 and F̃−12 := (1 − γ1TC)g2, respectively. Since
0 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ2, we have F̃−11 %d F̃−12 .
Given this, the arguments in part 2 above imply that g1 %dil g2, provided we can show
that (1 + γ1TC)F̃−1i is increasing for i = 1, 2 (which ensures that the corresponding operators
Γi(·) in the two modified societies are increasing). For i = 1, note that (1 + γ1TC)F̃−12 :=
(1 + γ1TC)(1 − γ2TC)g2 = (1 + γ1TC)F−1, which is increasing by the assumption on Pi and
γ1 > −1. For i = 2, note that (i) (1−γ22T 2C)g2 = (1+γ2TC)F−1 is increasing (by the assumption
on Pi and since γ2 > −1), and (ii) γ22T 2Cg2 %d γ21T 2Cg2 as 0 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ2. Combining (i) and (ii)
yields that (1 + γ1TC)F̃−11 := (1− γ21T 2C)g2 is increasing, as required.
D.2.6 Proof of Proposition C.5
Fix any ANE sAN =: s and θ. For each θ′, set ŝθ(θ′) := BRθ′(Ls,Pθ , L
s,P
θ ) and F̂θ(θ
′) :=
Ls,Pθ (ŝθ(θ
′)), and let P̂θ := F̂θ × F̂θ. To verify observational consistency, note that Lŝθ,P̂θθ (a) =
F̂θ(ŝ
−1
θ (a)) = L
s,P
θ (a) for each a, where the first equality uses P̂θ = F̂θ×F̂θ and the inverse ŝ
−1
θ is
well-defined and increasing by the surjectivity and monotonicity assumption on best-responses.










θ ) = BRθ′(G
ŝθ,P̂θ , Lŝθ,P̂θθ′ ),
where the second equality uses observational consistency and the third uses non-assortativity
of P̂θ. Thus, (P̂θ, ŝθ) is a coherent assortativity neglect perception for type θ.
To show uniqueness, consider any coherent assortativity neglect perception (P̂θ = F̂θ ×
F̂θ, ŝθ) for θ. Then, for each θ′, the perceived best-response condition, non-assortativity of









θ ). Moreover, P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and observational consistency imply F̂θ(ŝ
−1
θ (a)) =
Lŝθ,P̂θθ (a) = L
s,P
θ (a) for each a, which yields F̂θ(θ
′) = Ls,Pθ (ŝθ(θ
′)) for each θ′. Thus, (P̂θ, ŝθ)
coincides with the perceptions in the first paragraph.
D.2.7 Proof of Proposition C.6
Consider any monotone ANE sAN and any Nash equilibrium sNE. For any types θ > θ′, the





θ′ ) ≥ φ(θ)−φ(θ
′) = sNE(θ)−sNE(θ′) > 0,




θ′ (by monotonicity of
sAN and assortativity of P ). Thus, GsAN ,P is more dispersive than GsNE ,P .
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